Oppressed Shareholder Claim is Arbitratable

Disputes Between Shareholders Not Exempt from Arbration Act

An oppressed shareholder claim is not outside the reach of the New Jersey Arbitration Act, the Appellate Division of Superior Court held in litigation that appears to arise in significant part from a broken promise over the lease of a BMW.

The oppressed shareholder action was filed by dentist David Edenbaum, one of the two owners of State of the Art Smiles, P.A., alleging wrongful conduct under the New Jersey Business Coporation Act’s oppressed shareholder provision.  N.J.S.A. 14A:12-7.

Arbitration Clause in Shareholder Agreement

The allegation of shareholder oppression was made in an action filed in Chancery Division as well is an a counterclaim to a lawsuit filed by the other owner, Teresa Addeiego-Moore, claiming that Edenbuam had breached a separate agreement requiring him to transfer to her a portion of his interest in the practice equal to the leased vehicle in the event that he default on the payments.

Continue Reading

Business Divorce: Five Considerations You Should Consider

It’s the Wednesday afternoon before Thanksgiving and the phone rings with a new client.  The situation in the office has become an emergency.  Either someone has been locked out or someone needs to be locked out, or someone is walking out the door with a key client. Many of our cases begin as emergencies.

The dispute between LLC members, shareholders or partners erupts into a lawsuit without warning, or so it seems, and without planning.  Here are five considerations that are important to success in a litigated business divorce.

1.         Understand the Statutory Framework.

Different types of businesses may be treated the same for taxes – partnerships, S Corporations and limited liability companies – but they are very different creatures when it comes to disputes between the principal owners.  The “default rules” for issues that have not been addressed in the business organization documents are very different, and the liability of individuals can be widely different.

A couple of examples should give you an idea.  The limited liability company and partnership statutes in many states contain provisions that permit the expulsion of a troublesome member or partner.  There are standards that have to be met, and they are significant, but the member or partner who makes it nearly impossible to continue the business with their participation can be tossed out.

Not so with the close corporation.  Most statutes permit the minority to demand the purchase of his or her shares if the majority has acted oppressively, but not the other way around.  If the majority doesn’t have the votes to fire or remove a shareholder, they may be stuck with that person.

Most partnerships and limited liability statutes have a minority veto built into their structure.  Unless it was previously agreed, you cannot change the basic operating documents – the partnership agreement or the operating agreement – without the consent of all of the members or partners.  Corporations on the other hand can usually operate with a majority vote and can change their by-laws or certificate of incorporation.

Continue Reading

Shareholder Dispute Settlement Barred by Accidental Shooting

Oppressed Shareholder Settlement Void

 

Shareholders in New Jersey's Wild West City cannot distribute assets to resolve an oppressed shareholder action due to an unresolved claim involving an employee's accidental shooting. The case is a warning, perhaps, that prudence requires some due diligence before a release is signed to ensure  that there is not a lurking claim that could upset the settlement.

 

Purchase of Minority Interest

 

Family Photo of Scott HarrisOppressed shareholder actions almost invariably end with the compelled purchase and sale of the minority shareholder's interest. An unresolved claim, however, that could give a third party an interest in the company's assets may prevent any resolution of the dispute.

  

Stabile v. Stabile (Stabile v. Stablie.pdf) involved a dispute between the members of several family owned businesses owning a large tract of land in rural Sussex County, New Jersey and operating Wild West City, a western theme park. The businesses also held a liquor license and owned a contiguous restaurant. The litigation among the family members began in September 2005, when James Stabile filed suit alleging various breaches of duties by the directors of the business and minority shareholder oppression. In June 2006, the Court entered an order that the plaintiff was be bought out at fair value. The real estate holdings were appraised at about $11.45 million.

 

 

Continue Reading

Oppressed Shareholders Avoid Key Person Discounts

keyperson.jpgThis case goes into the “be careful what you say” category – particularly when it’s under oath, and particularly when you are involved in an oppressed shareholder action, or any other type of business divorce, for that matter.

 

Oppressed Shareholder Litigation

Oppressed shareholder actions almost invariably involve the purchase of the interests of some of the principals based upon valuations prepared by experts. One of the issues that the valuation expert will consider is whether a discount (or reduction in value) should be applied for the loss of a key person.

The inclination of the oppressed shareholder  is to insist that they were absolutely critical to the success of the business, while the controlling shareholders insists that the shareholder who was forced out or frozen out was of no use anyway.

There is no bonus for being important to the business in valuation proceedings. In fact, the opposite is true. It runs contrary to the emotions of the parties and is completely counterintuitive to non-lawyers. For example, the big rainmaker who accounts for 80 percent of his professional firm’s business, but has somehow gotten frozen out of the enterprise, should keep his opinion about the extent of the contribution to himself or herself.  The fact is that the enterprise is worth a lot less without them around, and that decrease in value may be reflected in a lower price for the purchase of their interests.

 

Key Person Discounts

There is surprisingly little case law on this topic in either New York or New Jersey and I am surprised that the issue does not come up more often between feuding principals. Yet you can have the unexpected situation in which a controlling shareholder fires key sales people and then asserts that they were absolutely critical – i.e., “key persons” – to the success of the business.

That was the case recently when the Supreme Court of New York County reviewed an application of this discount, which revealed an interesting point of the very personal nature of business divorce.  Matter of Abraham (Elite Techonology NY, Inc.), 2010 NY Slip Op 33225(U) (Sup. Ct. NY County Nov. 10, 2010), (opinion here) (Thanks to Peter Mahler’s NY Business Divorce blog for finding the decision and publishing the referee’s report).

The key person discount, in the context of business valuation, is defined by....

Continue Reading

Owners of Parent Corporations Should Have Remedies Against Officers of Subsidiary Businesses

Businesses often create additional new businesses, whether as joint ventures or subsidiaries. The flexibility and favorable tax treatment given to the limited liability company have made it fairly common that an LLC has other business entities as its owners.  For the individual owner, however, this situation can present problems.  The requirement that the members act at the company level often means less individual control and less ability to address acts of wrongdoing in the subsidiary or joint venture.

The individual owner’s recourse is the double derivative action, a complicated device in which the individual owner. asserts the rights of the parent to assert a claim as an owner of the subsidiary. It’s confusing, but the principle is generally well accepted.

 

An Example

An example that came up recently in our practice recently may help illustrate.  Two corporations formed a joint venture, each owning 50 percent.  The two corporations, lets call them A Corp. and B Corp., were each owned by two partners, 50 percent each. There were four individuals each with a 25 percent interest.  However, the members could only act at the entity level, meaning that A Corp. had one vote and B Corp. had one vote.  And, because both corporations needed the approval of both of its shareholders, the result was that all decisions had to be unanimous.

In addition, as is common, the principals were all appointed managers and had jobs in the business.The managers were elected and could be removed by a vote of the members.  So when one of the managers became a problem, that manager could not be removed by a vote of the members because the problem manager could block the affirmative vote of one of the parent entities.  

Consider the alternative as well.  If one of the individual owners has a real grievance at the level of the subsidiary or joint venture – mismanagement of the joint venture or exclusion from management, for example – there is no easy way to address the grievance if the majority is in disagreement.  The individual member is not an owner of the subsidiary.

 

Nature of Derivative Litigation

We hear most often about derivative suits in the context of large public corporations, but the same principles apply to the closely held corporation and they are commonly asserted in litigation among the owners.  A derivative suit is a claim brought by one of the owners of a business (shareholder or LLC member) that asserts a right owned by the business itself.

For example, when the president of a corporation wastes money using the corporate jet for personal vacations, an individual shareholder may sue derivatively on behalf of the corporation. The recovery, if any, belongs to the corporation and the shareholder benefits only indirectly to the extent that the business recovers.  But derivative actions are intended to prevent and deter wrongdoing by corporate insiders and the successful plaintiff in a derivative action can recover costs and legal fees.

 

Double Derivatives

In the double derivative, the individual seeks to enforce a right owned by the subsidiary (which the plaintiff does not own directly).  A recent case in the Delaware Supreme Court (Opinion here in Lambrecht v. Oneal.pdf) provides a good example.  In that case, Merrill Lynch was purchased by Bank of America for sto ck and all of ML’s stockholders received Bank of America stock for their ML shares.  ML became a subsidiary of Bank of America.  One of the former ML shareholders, now a Bank of America shareholder, brought a derivative claim alleging that the former ML management had damaged the corporation by, among other thins, paying huge bonuses to executives.

The plaintiff brought a claim that alleged that:

1)      ML had a claim against its former management.

2)      Bank of America, as a shareholder of ML, had a right to assert that claim derivatively against the managers.

3)      Plaintiff as a shareholder of Bank of America had the right to assert Bank of America’s claim derivatively against the managers because both Bank of America and ML had failed to sue themselves.

Put another way, the plaintiff sought to assert Bank of America’s right to stand in the shoes of Merrill Lynch and sue the allegedly liable managers.  The defendants attempt to dismiss the claim by arguing that the plaintiff did not have standing failed.

In the close corporation, individuals may have similar structural problems.  They are affected as individuals, but the structure of the business presents an obstacle.  Double derivatives are often their only real remedy.

Appellate Division Affirms Sale of Business as a Going Concern in Shareholder Dispute

The last-minute motion of a 50-percent shareholder to prevent the sale of a business as part as part of an oppressed shareholder lawsuit was insufficient to block the receiver from proceeding with the transaction, according to a New Jersey appellate court.

The opinion in Georgiadis v. Georgiadis, Docket No.: A-4018-08 (App. Div. June 21, 2010) demonstrates the ability of a chancery judge to manage a business divorce and fashion an equitable remedy based on the facts of the case, and the deference that the appellate courts give to those decisions.

The lawsuit arose between two brothers who owned equal shares in a diner in Mountainside.  One of the brothers left the business to run another diner in Connecticut.  When that diner closed, his brother refused to let him return to the business in Mountainside and an oppressed shareholder action followed.  The defendant brother filed a counter claim and the case was tried in 2007.

The remedy provided the defendant – who still controlled the business – could purchase his brother’s shares within 90 days of the order, otherwise the business would be dissolved, the assets sold by a receiver and distributed in equal shares to the parties.

When the defendant failed to buy his brother’s interest, a receiver was appointed and an offer of $1.35 million was received.  The defendant then offered to buy the plaintiff’s interest for $412,255, and when that was rejected moved to compel the purchase for the amount that the plaintiff would receive less deductions claimed by the defendant.

The trial court denied the motion, holding that the time to make such a purchase of the defendant’s interest had long since passed.  Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial judge had failed to fashion a remedy that would permit the defendant to retain the business.  Although courts are hesitant to force the sale of a going concern when one of the parties wants to continue to operate the business, in this case the application came too late.

In affirming the trial court's decision, the appellate division concluded that equity did not require the trial judge to provide the defendant to buy out his brother’s interest.

Exercise Care in Valuing Interests in New Jersey Business Breakups

A court orders a business valuation in a matter involving an oppressed shareholder claim. The appraiser, carefully applying the standards of his profession, sends an engagement letter describing a fair market value determination.  The appraisal will value the enterprise as a whole, then apply minority and marketability discounts.  The selling shareholder is going to argue for discounts – they always do – but the report will have all the information necessary for a determination either way.

For the minority shareholder, this can be a trap. And it may be the wrong move to wait for the trial to fight out the discount issue and the battle over the definition of fair value should be fought as early in the case as possible.  Here are a few reasons why.

The appraiser is going to prepare a report based on the standards of the valuation industry and that standard is fair market value – what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller.  He is going to try to avoid the tough issue of whether any discounts should apply. The AICPA’s Statement on Standards for Valuation Services No. 1 relegates the definition of “fair value” to a single paragraph in an appendix as a matter determined by state law in judicial proceedings.  

While fair value can mean anything that the circumstances dictate, New Jersey courts will usually, but not always, interpret fair value as simply the seller’s proportionate share of the value of the whole.  In other words, no discounts.

The professional appraiser, however, will make a thorough analysis of the amounts of a minority – lack of control – and marketability – lack of a public market – for the different interests, but will not probe to whether the application of discounts creates a windfall for either party unless told to do so by the court.  And in the real world, once all of that work is placed in a professionally bound volume with charts and statistics, it is harder to argue that it should be ignored.  

Minority and control discounts, however, are reserved for the extraordinary case in which they are necessary to prevent an unfair result.  The presumption should be that the selling shareholder gets his or her proportionate share of the full value of the enterprise.  An opinion from the court-ordered expert that there is no economic unfairness in that result is going to carry a great deal of weight in the ordinary case.

There is no reason to wait for the eve of trial to go through the exercise of establishing that fair value does not require any discounts to the minority’s interest.  The seller is going to become fixed on the small number once it has been written down, making it all that much harder to resolve the case without a trial.  

Unless, of course, you're the seller.  In which case, I would just sit tight.  Maybe no one will notice.